Living with the economists by Stafford, Charles
  
Charles Stafford 
Living with the economists 
 




Stafford, Charles (2011) Living with the economists. Anthropology of this century (1).  
 
© 2011 AOTC Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38023/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2011 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
Living with the Economists 
Charles Stafford 
 Economic Persuasions edited by Stephen Gudeman  
 Economy's Tension: The Dialectics of Community and Market by Stephen 
Gudeman 
At the LSE, where I work, there are so many economists that it is difficult to count them, 
much less keep track of what they are up to.  Many are based in the Economics 
Department, of course, but others are found elsewhere around the School – in such places 
as Finance and Social Policy, not to mention FMG, STICERD and SERC. What are these 
people doing? 
Perhaps the most influential of today’s LSE economists[1] is Nicholas Stern, lead author 
of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.  Long before sorting out 
climate change, however, Stern did something that might be of special interest to 
anthropologists.  In the mid 1970s, he and Christopher Bliss lived for eight months in the 
rural Indian community of Palanpur where they studied the local economy using a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative methods.  In fact, Palanpur has become one of Stern’s long-
term interests: he returns there periodically to keep track of socioeconomic 
transformations (which, in the event, have been dramatic).  So while anthropologists 
might object to Stern’s “economistic” approach – he is an economist, after all, and used 
to work at the World Bank – it’s hard to accuse him of knowing nothing about 




Then there is Richard Layard, who studies the economics of happiness and wellbeing.  To 
put it simply, the finding of Layard and others working in this field is that once people 
are reasonably secure in their lives additional wealth does not make them happier.  It 
therefore makes sense to take money away from them, via taxation, in order to fund 
social programmes (such as the free provision of psychological therapies) that can be 
shown to increase happiness, especially among the poor.  Layard cheerfully admits to 
being an old-school utilitarian, and his take on the psychology of economic life may 
fairly be characterized as “universalist”.  But it’s not as if he’s never heard of cultural 
variation: his father, John Layard, was a Jungian psychotherapist (one analysed by Jung 
himself) and, as some readers will know, a social anthropologist.  In 1914, at the age of 
23, Layard senior went with Haddon, Rivers, and others to Melanesia.  He ended up 
conducting a year of fieldwork in Atchin – having, it seems, been more or less abandoned 
there by Rivers – around the time Malinowski was carrying out fieldwork in the 
Trobriand Islands.[2]  Small world. 
Of course there are LSE economists whose fathers were not anthropologists, and who 
work on topics that seem miles away from anthropological concerns, and whose research 
presumably only makes sense to specialists.  A recent paper by Peter Robinson is entitled, 
seriously, “The Efficient Estimation of the Semiparametric Spatial Autoregressive 
Model”.  And yet much of the number crunching and model building being done around 
the LSE appears, at least on the surface, to be of a more accessible kind.  Francesco 
Caselli and colleagues have modeled the impact on corporate governance when family 
dynasties are in control (the impact, it seems, is pretty bad).  Using data from the USA, 
Leonardo Felli and colleagues have reached some thought provoking conclusions about 
gender and race preferences in the adoption of children.  John Hills and colleagues have 
published a doorstop of a report entitled “An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK” 
which is crammed full of depressing, but unfortunately very convincing, statistics.  Jorn-
Steffen Pischke and a colleague have written an interesting paper entitled “Zero Returns 
to Compulsory Schooling in Germany”, a key point being that in Germany the skills you 
need for the labour market are learned so early in schooling that additional years of it – 
typically presumed to be a good thing – are a bit pointless (actually completely pointless) 
in purely economic terms.  Christopher Pissarides works on the issue of “search frictions” 
in markets, not least of the kind that make it hard for unemployed people to find work, 
even when work is available. 
Rifling through publications by these colleagues, I was reminded of a comment by the 
economist Isabel Sawhill in her essay on the field of family economics: “To anyone who 
has been trained as an economist, the charms of economic analysis are nearly 
irresistible”.  Her point, I hasten to add, was that these charms should be resisted, at least 
some of the time.[3] 
*** 
Of course, anthropologists have long had it in for economists.  The question is: do we 
actually know what they do?  If the answer for most of us is basically “no”, as I suspect, 
then Economic persuasions should be a welcome book – for it brings together 
anthropologists and economists to “engage in a conversation across the disciplines”, in 
the words of the editor Stephen Gudeman. 
Unfortunately the book and the symposium from which it was drawn suffer from a fatal 
weakness with respect to this conversation.  Among the twelve listed contributors there 
are six anthropologists and one sociologist.  An historian is also listed: she provides 
material for the essay by one of the anthropologists.  There is also a specialist in 
organizational behaviour: his essay is co-authored with one of the anthropologists.  This 
leaves three “slots” for economists, which I suppose is not nothing, but then one of these 
is taken by an economist who is primarily an economic historian (at least as evidenced by 
his publications).  Another is taken by a man who holds “the world’s only chair in the 
field of cultural economics”; he doesn’t come across as very mainstream.  The final slot 
is taken by a New School economist who arguably has it in for his fellow economists 
even more than most anthropologists do. 
I am not questioning the value and interest of the essays written by these scholars and I 
agree with, or at least can see the case for, many of their conclusions.  My point is simply 
that this conversation between anthropologists and economists is surely rigged in the 
sense that nobody is present who might actually care to defend standard economics and 
try to explain its virtues (assuming there are any).  As a result, in most of these chapters 
we learn relatively little, if anything, about the actual practice of economics today, and 
surprisingly few attempts are made by the contributors to engage in detail with the claims 
that named economists have made with respect to their contemporary research.  
Meanwhile, a sustained critique of the assumptions, methods and claims of economic 
anthropology is more or less out of the question, it seems. 
  
  
To take a step back, the challenge given to the contributors was to think about economic 
life, and research on it, in terms of rhetoric – here roughly meaning “techniques of 
persuasion” (thus the book’s title, Economic persuasions).  It is certainly true that 
anthropologists and economists use different rhetorical/persuasive devices as part of their 
disciplinary toolkits.  James Carrier, in his essay on this theme, returns to the 
formalist/substantivist debate in anthropology, which to some extent echoes the divide 
between economists and anthropologists which still exists today.  As Carrier notes, most 
model-building economists and anthropological formalists take simplification to be a 
good thing, a positive step in the direction of understanding.  However, the majority of 
anthropologists, being substantivists, worry that simplification is really a step in the 
direction of “ignoring context” – as when development projects are designed around 
simplistic (and often powerfully seductive) models of human agency that ignore local 
realities, and thus go badly wrong.  The sociologist Richard Swedberg reprises this 
theme, encouraging social scientists to “resist the economists’ rhetorical use of the 
concept of interest” because it is, again, an oversimplification: it is “one-dimensional and 
profoundly nonsocial in nature” by comparison with the sociological one.  The economist 
William Milberg meanwhile argues that while some people might see the emergence of 
the new institutional economics as a good thing, or at least an advance over the crude 
simplifications of rational expectations theory, it is in fact a “new social science 
imperialism”, i.e. a way of reestablishing the hegemony of economics over the other 
social sciences.  We should beware its seductions.  Stephen Gudeman (whose 
contribution is a revised version of a chapter from his new single-author book, see 
below), notes that while economics may be “consoling in the face of uncertainty”, we 
should resist its totalizing rhetoric. 
Of course, economic life itself – and not just economists’ theories of it – may “persuade” 
in the sense that living in a particular environment may cajole or motivate the individuals 
in it to do certain things: e.g. to work, to save, to consume, to have or give up hope, and 
so on.  Indeed, the crucial point for this book as a whole is precisely the connection 
between these two phenomena, i.e. between economic life as a persuasive environment 
and economic science as a persuasive discipline.  This connection – noted in one way or 
another by most of the contributors – is perhaps illustrated most vividly in the essay by 
Jane Guyer (with Laray Denzer), which examines Nigeria during its period of structural 
adjustment and military rule.  This was a time when neoliberal rhetorics were (and not to 
their credit) part of a complex public discourse about the economic worlds, mostly 
unpleasant, in which ordinary people were obliged to live.  Here, Guyer explains, one 
found “a specific economic situation and a particular economic theory” being brought 
together.  She is therefore especially interested in struggles with and against the official 
rhetoric that supported neoliberal policies, e.g. as evidenced by newspaper editorials. 
Guyer tells us that this Nigerian debate eventually degenerated to a phase she refers to as 
“cacophony and silence”. 
Speaking of silence: Metin Cosgel expresses puzzlement in his essay at the near total lack 
of communication between anthropologists and economists, especially since both groups 
seem quite happy to talk with scholars from other social science disciplines.  In my view, 
the answer to this puzzle is simple, at least on the anthropology side, and it doesn’t have 
very much to do with “rhetoric” of the kind discussed by Cosgel.  One factor, of course, 
is that the mathematical/statistical orientation of modern economics makes a good deal of 
it totally incomprehensible to anthropologists.  But the main problem (which keeps most 
of us from even knowing that modern economics is mathematical/statistical) is surely 
political and is illustrated in the Guyer/Denzer chapter (as well as in the contribution by 
Sherry Ortner to this issue of AOTC).  Basically: anthropologists see modern economics 
as providing, above all, an ideological prop for capitalism in general and neoliberalism in 
particular.  Who would want to talk to these guys?  This is a defensible, even laudable, 
stance.  Still, I find it hard to believe that we have nothing to learn from the economists 
while they have everything to learn from us.  I am also reminded that Marx, for his part, 
spent years in the Reading Room of the British Library immersing himself in the detail of 
the economics of his day before setting out to comprehensively trash it. 
*** 
At this point it must be said that the editor of Economic persuasions, Stephen Gudeman, 
is himself very knowledgeable about economics.  This becomes clear on the first pages of 
his single-author book, Economy’s tension[4], where he writes about his misgivings not 
only with rational choice theory (which he tried and failed to apply during early 
fieldwork in Panama), but also with “bounded rationality” critiques of it and, finally, with 
the new institutionalism – which still relies, in his view, on a flawed “idea of the rational 
chooser”.  In fact, Gudeman argues, calculative reason is something that spreads in 
human societies along with their colonization by competitive trade: it is an outcome of a 
certain type of economic activity, rather than being a natural component of human life 
and thought, and it is moreover something that really changes the way we live, at least 
partly for the worse. 
Of course, competitive trade of one kind or another may be said to be part of economic 
life in most if not all societies.  This fact leads to the main point of Gudeman’s book: that 
the economy is comprised of both a “mutual realm” of communal or collective life and a 
“market realm” of competitive trade, the latter dominated by calculation.  As Gudeman 
puts it: 
“These two value domains are dialectically connected: they often conflict and resist each 
other, and their relations shift over time.  I call this model the tension in economy, and I 
try to show how calculative reason emerges through repetitive transactions between 
suppliers and buyers to become the central force in economy’s dialectic (p.4).” 
To amplify this last point: Gudeman suggests that in recent human history the market 
realm, with its particular form of reason, has increasingly “cascaded” into the mutual 
realm – that is, has increasingly taken it over.  This has huge socioeconomic 
consequences.  And if economic science seems a powerful way of explaining more or 
less everything in our world today it is precisely because the world it explains is 
something it helped to create. 
Given the specifics of Gudeman’s model, it might have been useful to contrast it 
explicitly with the dialectical model set out by Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry in 
Money and the morality of exchange.  They too see a tension between two interacting 
economic domains, or “transactional orders”: a relatively individualistic one built around 
short term exchanges and another one built around long term exchanges that ultimately 
lead to the reproduction of the social.  A crucial point is that Bloch and Parry stress the 
ideological and/or repressive potential of this second transactional order – the collective 
one – whereas Gudeman arguably has a tendency to romanticize what he calls the mutual 
realm.  I am also struck by the fact that while Gudeman’s argument is essentially 
psychological, i.e. it is an argument about a change in human reasoning, he says very 
little about psychological mechanisms or evidence, as such.  The claim that competitive 
trade is the source of rational calculation in human life (cf. the extended discussion of 
“Trade’s Reason” in Chapter 3) is mostly asserted rather than shown, is certainly 
debatable, and I doubt that psychologists would find it very convincing. 
Be that as it may, Gudeman’s model is thought provoking and his elaboration of it – in 
chapters focused on trade, money, property and other phenomena – is sophisticated.  His 
conclusions might be said to reproduce anthropological (or at least substantivist) 
orthodoxy, to some extent, but his framing of this orthodoxy is original and important.  
Among other things, Gudeman accepts that economists’ models do, after all, have a 
certain relevance in most of the world, and not just in the “late capitalist” West.  As a 
result, this book – much more so than Economic persuasions – suggests why economists 
and anthropologists might profit from having critical conversations that genuinely cut in 
both directions. 
1. At least until the award of a Nobel Prize to one of his colleagues, Christopher 
Pissarides, last year.  
2. A brief biographical note on John Layard can be found here: 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/data/13030/wp/tf058003wp/files/tf058003wp.pdf.  
3. Isabel Sawhill, “Economic perspectives on the family”, Daedalus, vol 106, no. 2, 
spring 1977.  
4. As noted above, Gudeman’s own chapter in the Economic persuasions edited 
collection is a revised version of one of the chapters in Economy’s tension.  
 
